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Abstract Bioethics can be considered as a topic, an academic discipline (or
combination of disciplines), a field of study, an enterprise in persuasion. The his-
torical specificity of the forms bioethics takes is significant, and raises questions
about some of these approaches. Bioethics can also be considered as a governance
practice, with distinctive institutions and structures. The forms this practice takes
are also to a degree country specific, as the paper illustrates by drawing on the
author’s UK experience. However, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Bioethics can provide a starting point for comparisons provided that this does not
exclude sensitivity to the socio-political context. Bioethics governance practices are
explained by various legitimating narratives. These include response to scandal, the
need to restrain irresponsible science, the accommodation of pluralist views, and the
resistance to the relativist idea that all opinions count equally in bioethics. Each
approach raises interesting questions and shows that bioethics should be studied as a
governance practice as a complement to other approaches.
Keywords Bioethics  Governance  UNESCO Declaration  Ethics committees 
Legitimation  UK Bioethics
Bioethics is rarely out of the news. A quick look at the BBC website’s health news
front page for 1 May 2015 identified a range of stories that most would recognise as
raising bioethical issues. They included the first ‘natural’ delivery of a woman who
relied on an artificial pancreas, the modification of the DNA of a human embryo,
direct-to-consumer testing services (for HIV), malaria vaccine trials, and wheels
designed for cat physiotherapy. There can be little doubt that there is something of
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interest going on, but it is less clear whether there are common threads that link
these questions, and, if so, what they are. Should we focus on the use of novel
technologies, privileging the modern miracle of the artificial pancreas over the
ancient miracle of birth? Or should we stress the human dimension, excluding the
feline intervention from the scope of bioethics?
In order for us to address such issues, they need to be identified and framed in a
manner that enables us to work towards resolution of the practical dilemmas that
they generate. This paper suggests that it is helpful to think about this by exploring
the governance practices that have developed to help societies respond to the
choices and challenges that arise in the field of bioethics. It does not claim that this
should replace other ways of thinking about bioethics, but it does suggest that
bioethics governance is an important subject in its own right and that it should
supplement other more established perspectives in order to create a fuller picture.
Some mapping of the field of bioethics is necessary if we are to understand the
subject matter over which governance is being exercised. However, the boundaries
do not need to be precise or fixed. Governance can be established even in the face of
disagreement over the inclusion of specific issues within its scope. The paper begins
by examining the content of the academic field of bioethics as a subject area for
study. It is important for bioethics governance because it speaks to the scope of its
jurisdiction. The idea of jurisdiction provides a helpful framework for the
consideration of governance questions. As used here, it denotes the processes of
marking out the territory in which ‘bioethics’ is accepted to be the most appropriate
perspective for considering questions, constituting bioethicists or bioethics bodies as
the authoritative decision-makers, and delineating the terms on which this authority
is conferred. A jurisdictional perspective enables both descriptive and normative
questions to be identified. Thus, we can (and should) consider separately how the
jurisdiction has come to be constituted from whether it can be defended as
legitimate.
In addition to matters of scope, bioethics governance needs to address questions
of working methods and the human resources required. The paper therefore
considers briefly aspects of the debate over whether there is a discrete academic or
practical discipline of bioethics. There can be little doubt that academics have
arranged their work to address the field. Centres, journals and courses are badged
under the label of bioethics. The question for the purposes of this paper is whether
this has led to a distinctive discipline and methodology. This is linked to the
question of whether bioethics as a governance practice should be the province of
‘expert’ bioethicists.
The idea that bioethics can be understood as a practice is not new. As with all
academic disciplines, there is a social element to way in which it has developed. In
some countries, this has led to the professionalization of bioethics [19], with a
degree of governance of the activities of bioethicists [4]. There has also long been a
tendency to codify bioethical positions into quasi-legal guidance, extending
bioethics from private discussion into a more public and collective process.
Parallels can be drawn with other areas of applied ethics, such as business ethics and
its manifestation in expectations of corporate social responsibility. However, the
extent to which bioethical practices have been consolidated into advisory and
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regulatory structures (such as ‘ethics committees’) is distinctive. These have a
recognized place in global governance mechanisms through the UNESCO Universal
Declaration on Bioethics 2005. It is these processes of institutionalization that I
suggest constitute the primary forms of bioethics governance. However, although
the UNESCO formulation provides a useful framework for discussion, it is not the
only manifestation of governance activities.
The UK, for example, deploys a range governance practices beyond the activities
specified in the Declaration. The ideas and questions explored in this paper have
emerged from the author’s reflections on personal experience of the institutions of
bioethics governance in the UK and the primary examples it uses are therefore
drawn from there.1 One of the arguments of the paper is that attention needs to be
given to the socio-political contexts in which bioethics institutions operate if they
are to be well understood. Some institutions may look similar but have different
roles and scope. Even a superficial comparison between the work of the French
Comite´ Consultatif Nationale d’Ethique and the UK’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics
shows that they have significant differences in the topics they have addressed and
their ways of working even though they are also in many ways very similar [22, 44].
Bioethics governance should, therefore, be considered in terms of its functions as
well as its institutions. In our morally pluralist society, there is considerable
divergence of views on many bioethical issues. Various committees, commissions,
and authorities have been created to mediate such disagreements, facilitate sufficient
consensus to enable public policy choices to be made, maintain public confidence
(especially in the responsible use of scientific advances) and reduce the risks that
disagreement will manifest itself in social conflict. These responses can be understood
as part of an ecosystem of bioethics governance. The aims of this paper are to
demonstrate that thinking about bioethics as a governance practice will enhance our
understanding of such activities and to draw attention to some features of this approach
that merit further consideration, thus sketching an agenda for further study.
What is Bioethics?
Bioethics as a Subject
We might seek to define the subject of bioethics by reference to the topics that fall
within its scope. The term seems to have emerged in the context of environmental
1 The author is currently Chair of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and also of England’s Health
Research Authority. Previously, I was Chair of the Human Genetics Commission (2009–12), a Working
Party on a Strategy for Brain Tissue Banking for the UK Clinical Research Collaboration (2007–8) and
the Southampton and South West Hampshire Joint Research Ethics Committee (1998–9). My
memberships of UK committees engaged in bioethics governance have included the Committee on the
Ethical Aspects of Pandemic Influenza 2006-, the Human Genomics Strategy Group 2010–12, the Organ
Donation Taskforce 2008–10, and the Medical Ethics Committee of the British Medical Association
(2003–8). The views expressed in this paper are personal and do not represent the positions of any of
these bodies or committees. This paper is a revised version of the 2015 Annual Lecture of the Centre for
Health Ethics and Law at Southampton Law School, held in conjunction with Health Care Analysis. I am
grateful for the comments of the members of the Centre and the two anonymous reviewers for the
journal. I take full responsibility for the errors that remain.
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ethics [35, 67, 51, 57], but soon came to be used in relation to medicine and
scientific advance. Levine identifies the early agenda pursued by North American
scholars in the emerging field of bioethics as comprising research ethics, death and
dying, genetics, reproductive technologies and behavioural control [35]. Dunstan,
an Anglican theologian active in ethical discussions in the UK in the 1970s selected
many similar issues to illustrate his thesis about The Artifice of Ethics—a study of
the ‘institutions built to support and shelter the frail but precious moral judgments of
mankind’—birth control, the use of aborted fetuses in medical research, genetic
engineering, IVF, abortion, and euthanasia. He was less clear, however, that these
illustrated a specific area of bioethics. His analysis placed these examples alongside
questions about business ethics and the conduct of war (covering both the use of
lethal force in Northern Ireland and what might now be called ‘weapons of mass
destruction’—biological and thermo-nuclear warfare) [16].
Wilson has argued that the identification of bioethics as a separate area for
consideration in the UK should be attributed to Ian Kennedy’s 1980 Reith lectures,
The Unmasking of Medicine [31, 67]. These covered a range of issues that had
become medicalized but which Kennedy argued needed to be re-appropriated by
society. His opening list contained heart transplants, the definition of death, the
treatment of the dying (including prolonging insensate life), the selective treatment
of handicapped new born babies, and the treatment of the mentally ill [30]. Thus, he
linked UK bioethics to issues in medical practice and its advance.
A flavour of the current scope of the academic literature can be gleaned from the
contents of two leading collections. Bioethics: An Anthology edited by philosophers
Kuhse and Singer contains eighty-one extracts, grouped into sections on abortion,
reproductive technologies (including surrogate motherhood, sex selection, embryos
as tissue donors and cloning), ‘the new genetics’, life and death, resource allocation,
organ donation, experimentation (both human and animal), ethical issues in the
practice of health care (mostly relating to aspects of confidentiality and consent), a
separate section on issues facing nurses, and finally four pieces on ethicists and
ethics committees [34]. This broadly reflects an approach that presents bioethics as
addressing choices that are made in and around health services. Methodological
issues are generally drawn out within solutions to specific problems rather than
presented as of interest in their own right.
Steinbock’s [60] Oxford Handbook of Bioethics selects only thirty pieces and
takes an approach that focuses less on topics than methods. It opens with a group of
essays on theoretical and methodological issues and addresses justice and policy-
making before moving to selected essays on the topics of bodies and body parts, end
of life, reproduction and cloning, genetics and enhancement, research ethics, and
finally justice and global health. This opens up interest in the way in which
bioethical matters should be approached, including the possibility that there might
be expert ‘bioethicists’; experts who are particularly authoritative guides to the
subject. This might manifest itself in the form of a discrete academic discipline, but
even this snapshot from two anthologies is enough to remind us that there is
sufficient variation in discussion of scope and methods to make the idea that
bioethics institutions might be best staffed by expert bioethicists politically
controversial [12, 33, 61]. It is perhaps better to think in terms of bioethics being a
6 Health Care Anal (2016) 24:3–23
123
field or enterprise. As Sheehan and Dunn put it: ‘disciplines are closely tied to
methodologies and traditions of thought, whereas what counts as a field is driven by
a set of questions’ [59].
Bioethics as a Discipline?
Harris [25] has argued that the modern understanding of bioethics has two main
historical roots. The first is the ethics of the medical profession. He suggests this
was more a matter of norms of practice and etiquette than reasoned reflection,
although this may not do justice to the richness of the tradition of medical ethics [5,
28]. The second was moral philosophy. It is this that Harris [25] sees as the driver
for modern bioethics, suggesting that is essentially a specialist area within applied
moral philosophy.2 Warnock, also a professional philosopher and a key figure in UK
bioethics, pursued a slightly different dynamic, resisting the idea that philosophical
expertise should determine public policy while welcoming the role of bioethics in
rescuing British philosophical ethics from an analytical dead-end by replacing the
focus on the logic of ethical discourse with an interest in substantive questions [67].
These claims raise questions about the disciplinary nature of bioethics. Conceptual
work is needed to define the scope of bioethics, and refine its methods so as to
enable poor and robust work to be distinguished. However, its connection to policy-
making needs further explanation.
Further, the way in which bioethical work is organised and funded has a significant
impact on what counts as bioethics. In the USA in the 1970s, bioethics emerged as a
new academic and practical discipline through the creation of institutions. The
Hastings Center, originally the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences was
established in 1969 [9, 35]. The Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown was
established in 1971 [35].3 Many more followed as bioethics took root in the academy.
The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities now has over 1800 members.4 It
is hard, therefore, to resist the conclusion that bioethics is an area for academic
activity. However, it does not follow that there is a discrete academic discipline with a
distinctive set of concerns, conceptual tools and methodologies.
Context is crucial. Rothman argues that there was a very specific congruence of
political forces that made the context in America particularly hospitable to the
emerging thinking on bioethics. He cites the civil rights movement’s wider
challenges to power and authority, including anti-discrimination provisions that
became applied to neonatal care decisions, the Patient Bill of Rights (formally
developed by the America Hospitals Association in 1973), and the development of
the right of privacy in the courts in the key medical case of Roe v Wade on abortion.
The particular manifestation of bioethics suited the zeitgeist.
The fit between the movement and the times was perfect. Just when courts
were defining an expanded right to privacy, the bioethicists were emphasising
2 See Wilson [67] for discussion of how this philosophical assumption came to dominate.
3 Originally established as the Joseph and Rose Kennedy Center for the Study of Human Reproduction
and Bioethics.
4 www.asbh.org (last accessed 23 October 2015).
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the principle of autonomy, and the two meshed neatly; judges provided a legal
basis and bioethicists, a philosophical basis for empowering the patient.
Indeed, just when movements on behalf of a variety of minorities were
advancing their claims, the bioethicists were defending another group that
appeared powerless - patients. All these advocates were siding with the
individual against the constituted authority; in their powerlessness, patients
seemed at one with women, inmates, homosexuals, tenants in public housing,
welfare recipients, and students, who were all attempting to limit the
discretionary authority of professionals [57:245].
On this view, the discipline of bioethics is aligned with philosophy, political theory
and human rights law. In terms of the disciplinary power, bioethics is characterised
as competing with medicine for jurisdiction.
Evans [19] provides a sociological account of the history of US bioethics that
also concentrates on the struggle for jurisdiction, but characterizes it as being
between science and theology. He describes the transmutation of the work of
theologians into bioethics in the form of ‘principlism’, which he sees as the
distinctive methodology on which the claim of bioethics to be a ‘discipline’ is
based. In line with the political philosophy of Rawls, and in particular his idea of
‘public reason’ [54], Evans argues that this enabled bioethics to claim a degree of
neutrality between substantive approaches. He notes Engelhardt’s position that
bioethics could develop a ‘moral lingua franca’ without ‘endorsing a particular
moral vision’ [18:ix].
These two rather different approaches share the insight that the nature of
argumentation in bioethics is shaped by the circumstances in which it emerges. This
should make us cautious on putting too much weight on the conception of bioethics
as a discipline. The intellectual approaches that have driven bioethics in mainland
Europe have been different, with more focus on personhood, the virtues of patient-
professional relationships, solidarity and human dignity [58]. The USA has been
dominated by Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles of autonomy, non-
maleficence, beneficence and justice [6].
Both approaches can be found in the UK. However, the dominant view in Britain
in the 1970s was that medical ethics assisted doctors to make better decisions, and
that this was contrasted with the ‘American trend’ of bioethics in which outsiders
had assumed the role of ‘society’s conscience’ on issues previously entrusted to
doctors [66]. This focus on supporting health professionals to make ethically
informed decisions, on the assumption that they adhere to a system of moral values
has continued to underpin much of legal regulation in the UK [38, 39, 42]. This has
not prevented the emergence of a significant ‘bioethics industry’, but it has taken the
form of practices for public governance.
British work on bioethics did not begin with the creation of new academic
centres, but by working within the established professional institutions, in what
Wilson describes as ‘club regulation’ [67:ch 2]. This is less clearly rooted in
disciplinary competition. He sees the emergence of UK Bioethics as an aspect of the
ascendancy of the Audit Society, in which social institutions were constrained and
controlled by measurement and oversight [67:ch 3]. He argues that although
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Kennedy’s Reith lectures adapted an intellectual discipline of bioethics from the US
academic tradition, it took root because of its congruence with the Thatcherite
programme to break down the power of the traditional professions. Wilson sees the
1980s and 1990s as the ‘high water-mark’ of bioethics. Prior to these decades, what
is now known as bioethics was a collaboration of the professional establishments of
church, medicine and law. During those decades, the professions were drawn into
conflict and competition with each other by wider social processes. The emergence
of bioethics was one of the ways in which those conflicts played out. Wilson cites
the critique of the Audit Society by Baroness Onora O’Neill [46] in the Reith
lectures for 2002 as a further watershed as the general retreat from big government
manifested itself in the dismantling of the instruments of bioethics governance. He
suggests that ‘today, neither the government, nor many bioethicists, share
Kennedy’s belief that oversight is the best way to ensure public accountability [65].’
Bioethics in the UK thus moved more quickly into governance practices than
academic ones and, perhaps as a result, has not reached the same disciplinary
definition as seen in the USA. Indeed, in the UK, few people see themselves as
professional bioethicists [10]. Rather, Onora O’Neill has suggested, bioethics
should be seen as a communal practice. It ‘is not a discipline’, but instead provides
‘a meeting ground for a number of disciplines, discourses and organizations
concerned with ethical, legal and social questions raised by advances in medicine,
science and technology’ [47:1]. This identification of bioethics as a field of study, to
which many disciplines can contribute suggests the need for mechanisms for co-
ordination of activity.
Bioethics as an Enterprise?
This co-ordination is often directed at a particular kind of purpose. One of the
characteristics of contemporary bioethics is that it has taken a ‘public’ turn, in which
it ‘constitutes a resource for the formation of public policy which impacts upon the
social world [52:8].’ Sheehan and Dunn have described this as a requirement of
‘practicality’, suggesting that it counts against a bioethical argument that it could
not be implemented.
a piece of research or public activity is not correctly defined as bioethics
unless it aims at actually convincing people to act differently or to change
policy because of the arguments and answers that the bioethicist provides
[59:58].
Bioethics must be ‘sensitive to the realities of political contingencies and
institutional constraints’ [59:58], and
It is an entirely appropriate response to an argument in bioethics that is
impractical, or, for example, that its actual implementation would not succeed
because the argument fails to consider relevant contextual features of the
relevant situations [59:59].
They describe bioethics as concerned with primary ‘ought’ questions (e.g. the best
policy on abortion), to which a series of secondary questions are relevant because of
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the practicality requirement. These include ‘the nature and functioning of the
regulatory system.’
However, the issues of practicality perhaps become the primary, rather than
secondary questions when bioethics is considered as a public facing enterprise. The
starting point for addressing the ‘ought’ questions is the available practical options
and a substantive position is already implicit within the status quo. The issue is
about whether there is a case for change. The onus of proof lies on those who
propose reform and the burden of proof requires a sufficiently compelling argument
to justify investing the energy necessary to overcome the forces of inertia. The
playing field is not an even one, but the unevenness is entirely contextual. The status
quo may be different in different places in relation to the same question. Reform
proposals developed by bioethicists should therefore be understood in their specific
historical, political and social contexts [43].
Thinking about bioethics as an enterprise, aimed at public persuasion and impact,
enables us to focus on dimensions that are marginal to the normative tasks of the
version of the discipline that sees itself as rooted in applied moral philosophy. We
should think not so much about what bioethics ‘is’ as about what it does. We should
be concerned to understand the nature of bioethics as a Foucauldian ‘discipline’, a
discursive technology of social control [56], and look for a normative framework for
critique that is sensitive to the way in which bioethics asserts its jurisdiction in
matters of public significance, not merely private morality. We should also be
concerned to study the institutions by which society governs matters of bioethical
significance. Dunstan describes a societal activity in which ‘the moralist, having
seen his (sic) vision, or arrived at his position, must weave his insight into the fabric
of society by creating an institution in which to embody it’ [16:4]. We must consider
the structures and functions of bioethics governance.
Bioethics as a Governance Practice
Typologies of Governance Practices
The examination of institutions shifts the focus of the practice of bioethics from an
intellectual enterprise to a governance one. Duwell has described an institutional-
isation of bioethics as a response to a mixture of demands from clinicians for
support, emerging public concerns, (including those about technological advances
and also scandalous behaviour), and the changing political contexts in which long-
standing questions about the value of life were debated and translated into principles
and rules to guide public life. He draws attention to three types of committee. First,
those formed to advise political institutions (concerned with ethical reflection on
emerging problems). Second, those to provide assurance that established ethical
principles have been observed (such as research ethics committees). Third, those
devised to support individual decision-making in particular cases (typically
described as ‘clinical’ ethics committees). Each of these aims to provide support
on bioethical issues, but in different ways and for different purposes. The first is
aligned with existing political or professional authority (such as governments,
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hospitals) and offers advice on how to exercise it. The second rarely engages
directly in ethical reflection, but is concerned with ensuring compliance with
established standards. The third is concerned with specific cases and Duwell
suggests that it serves to ‘create a space within the clinical praxis in which conflict
situations can be dealt with transparently with regard to both argumentation and
procedure’ [17:2–5].
A similar typology can be derived from the UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Bioethics (2005), which adds a fourth category about wider public discussion (one
recognized by Duwell but not considered to be institutionalized). Article 19 of the
Declaration states:
Independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees should be
established, promoted and supported at the appropriate level in order to:
(a) assess the relevant ethical, legal, scientific and social issues related to
research projects involving human beings;
(b) provide advice on ethical problems in clinical settings;
(c) assess scientific and technological developments, formulate recommenda-
tions and contribute to the preparation of guidelines on issues within the scope
of this Declaration;
(d) foster debate, education and public awareness of, and engagement in,
bioethics.
This international instrument has legitimated both a capacity building programme,5
and also the comparison and critique of the bioethics governance structures in
different states [48, 62, 63]. Even though the forms that bioethical governance
practices take must be understood as generated within a specific historical context,
comparisons and discussions can only proceed with a schematic analysis of some
sort. However, we should not limit the conception of governance processes to this
schema as the tools that are used in bioethics governance are more contingent and
diverse than the UNESCO Declaration suggests.
The Historical Contingency of Bioethics Governance
Understanding this requires historical consideration of how bioethics became
institutionalised into the specific forms of committees, regulatory bodies and
commissions. Jonsen has documented the transition from the 1960s as a ‘decade of
conferences’, in which scientists from across the world came together to discuss the
emerging possibilities, into the 1970s when bioethics became the province of
Government commissions [29]. The emergence of these earliest governance bodies
seems more nationally determined. Rothman’s study of how medical ethics became
detached from the internal morality of the profession traces the tousles in the US
Congress that led to the establishment of National Commissions [57:ch9]. He shows
how professional resistance to external scrutiny frustrated politicians and con-
tributed to the creation of Commissions on which medics were in a minority.
5 Assisting Bioethics Committees, see http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/
themes/bioethics/assisting-bioethics-committees/ (last accessed 23 October 2015).
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Professional witnesses denied the relevance of the concerns put to them, suggested
that outsiders lacked competence in these matters, and implied that their
appearances before the committee were a waste of their valuable time.
In this context, the transfer of power and authority in bioethics from the medical
profession to ‘strangers’ by the creation of commissions to deliberate on issues of
principle can be seen to flow from the resistance of the profession to the legitimacy
of public debate, and its denial of political authority in the area. This was extended
by the Superior Court of New Jersey in the Quinlan case, which suggested the use of
committees to oversee individual clinical decisions as a way of addressing
perceptions that doctors were faced with conflicting interests and to provide
protection from civil and criminal liability [27]. Despite the fact that this was not a
decision that was legally binding in other states, the decision was followed by
increased formality within hospitals for oversight of clinical decisions; an Optimum
Care Committee was established at Massachusetts General Hospital, formal
guidelines began to be drawn up and reference to court increased. Lawyers began
to play a prominent role [57:229–235].
Robert Baker attributes the particular shape of the development of bioethics in
the USA less to the arrogance of doctors in respect of ethical issues than to their
complacency:
organized medicine’s laissez-faire abandonment of medical ethics created a
void in the marketplace of ideas and a vacuum of moral authority. To fill this
void, legislators, bureaucrats, the courts, and American society generally
sought ideas and invested moral authority elsewhere, ultimately finding it in an
oddball collection of lumpen intellentsia who were soon valorized as ethics
experts or ‘‘bioethicists’’ [5:279].
He points out that in Europe, organized medicine never abandoned its jurisdiction
over ethics. Consequently, bioethics developed as a collaborative not antagonistic
enterprise.
Thus, the institutions of bioethics governance do not play precisely the same
roles in different societies. We have already noted Wilson’s description of early
British bioethics as a system ‘club regulation’. This collaborative approach
continued with the emergence of institutions of bioethics governance. In the UK, the
medical profession was not forced into developing such bodies, but took a lead. It
moved more quickly than Government to establish a body to provide ethical
oversight in the context of assisted reproductive technologies. A Voluntary (later
renamed Interim) Licensing Authority was established soon after the publication of
the Warnock report in 1984 [55], and broadly played the same role as was
subsequently taken on by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority from
1991 when the legislation came into force. The doctors’ trade union, the British
Medical Association developed a Handbook of Medical Ethics that promoted a
focus on raising expectations that doctors should meet ethical standards in advance
of the regulator’s interest which for many decades was on misconduct rather than
good practice [41:42–44]. British bioethics has been less confrontational than its US
equivalent and the history and functions of its institutions need to be considered
with that in mind.
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However, we should not to develop too narrow a conception of governance
processes. There is more to governance than the constitutions of committees. It is
also important to recognise the messiness of the connection between the institutions
actually created and the stylized explanations of their purpose. These points can be
drawn out of a brief discussion of some of the functions of bioethics governance.
Functions of Bioethics Governance
Evans’ [19] sociological perspective on bioethics identifies four jurisdictional
spaces that might be inhabited by bioethicists. These concern health care ethics
consultations, research bioethics, public policy bioethics, and cultural bioethics.
Evans’ account stresses the importance of understanding the ‘jurisdiction givers’
who provide access to these spaces. He suggests that the possibility of the
professionalization of bioethics in the USA, and also the principlist form it took,
were a consequence of the government officials becoming jurisdiction givers. Their
expectations were for an abstract body of knowledge that could claim to provide a
common morality in a pluralist society. As bioethics adopted this form it gained
jurisdiction. Evans argues that the status of professional bioethics is waning in the
USA because both government and the media (as gatekeepers to cultural bioethics)
are turning directly to the spokespeople for partisan social movements rather than
looking to bioethicists to mediate the opposing arguments.
This section of the paper considers four justificatory narratives that provide
plausible explanations for governance activities, and therefore serve to legitimate it.
These are the response to scandalous activity, the imperative to address public
concerns about potentially irresponsible scientific advance, the need to resolve deep
disagreements about bioethical matters in a pluralist society, and the desire to
delineate public bioethics from other political issues. These narratives are not the
only ones that might be considered, but they are sufficient to show that thinking
about bioethics as a governance practice raises distinctive questions that merit
further study.
Bioethics Governance as a Response to Scandal: The Case of Research
Governance
One of the dominant narratives that serves to drive bioethics governance is that it is
a necessary response scandals of professional immorality. This is perhaps most
easily seen in relation to the governance of medical research. On this account, the
abuse of human research subjects leads to regulatory interventions to control
researchers and protect participants. While doubts have been raised about the
historical accuracy of this explanation in respect of specific regulatory develop-
ments [26], there is little doubt that it is seen by many as the explanation for the
need for governance.
Even if this account of the origins of research governance is more myth than
history, it enables us to connect the rationale with an appropriate framework of
critique. Given that scandal is generated by events that are considered to transgress
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norms (even if those norms were never explicit), a successful governance
framework will address both the occurrence of such events and the management
of expectations in order to sustain public trust and confidence. This need not be seen
as an exercise in external control. The research community has an interest in good
governance provided that it serves to maintain the social licence that it requires for
its work [15].
So far as the tools of bioethics governance are concerned, three dimensions of the
regulation of health research are worthy of mention. The first concerns the
codification of principles. Here, the response to the abuses of Nazi medicine that
were revealed in the War Trials is often regarded as pivotal. The ‘Nuremberg
Principles’ stressed the primacy of individual rights over the advancement of
science and the importance of informed consent [1, 23]. The World Medical
Association took this approach forward in the Declaration of Helsinki, first adopted
in 1964 and amended for the seventh time in 2013 [69]. It is important not to claim
too much for this component of bioethics governance. Germany was the first
country to pass laws protecting research subjects, so Nazi medicine was not pursued
in ignorance of the requirements [20:106, 23]. Nevertheless, standards are an
important tool. They make it clear to researchers what is expected of them,
hopefully providing a guide to their conduct but also enabling them to be called to
account. They can also be protective, offering a means to explain to the public that
they are acting ethically. Committees charged with scrutinizing research cannot be
identified as ‘ethics’ committees without some set of principles to define ethical
issues. In the absence of such standards, even if they are gatekeepers whose
permission is required before research takes place, they not are not engaged with
bioethics governance but with other types of question such as scientific review,
prioritization of resources or reputation management.
Principles may be essential to the creation of an ethical governance system, but
they are not sufficient. As the expose´s of Beecher in the USA [7], and Pappworth in
the UK [49, 50], showed significant numbers of medical research studies were (in
various different ways) unethical long after the Nuremberg Principles had been
promulgated. This was more a professional than public scandal, although Beecher’s
criticisms were neglected until amplified by journalists. Both came from within the
medical profession not outside it. So too did the most visible governance
mechanism in medical research, the Institutional Review Board or Research Ethics
Committee. This was promoted by the US Surgeon General in 1966 on prompting
by the US National Institutes of Health (which had had some sort of ethical review
since 1953) [26:333] and extended as a regulatory requirement by the Belmont
Report in 1979 [57:ch5]. As Adam Hedgecoe has shown, the history of RECs in the
UK is similarly bottom up [26]. It began in hospitals seeking US funding. It was
picked up pragmatically by the Royal College of Physicians in the form of a
Committee on the Ethical Supervision on Clinical Investigations in Institutions,
which reported in 1967. Committees were required administratively by the
Department of Health in its Red Book of 1991 [13]. They only became a legal
requirement in 2004 following the implementation of the EU’s clinical trials
directive [37]. Prior review by gatekeeping committees is now an established part of
the governance structure for medical experimentation to provide assurance that
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studies are designed in accordance with the ethical principles previously
established.
In itself, this does nothing to ensure that studies are well conducted and following
a research scandal in North Staffordshire [24], the UK National Health Service put
in place a further dimension of the governance, known as the Research Governance
Framework for Health and Social Care [14]. This incorporated the features already
described; a restatement of principles (the primacy of the rights of participants,
informed consent, confidentiality and data protection) and the requirement of ethics
review. However, it went further and specified the separate responsibilities for the
conduct of the trial that lay with (a) principal investigators, (b) research sponsors,
and (c) the organisations which employ the researchers. These clarifications have
enabled accountability for breaches in the conduct of research, monitored by the
Health Research Authority, although regulatory action in this area remains rare.
Thus, we have an archetype of a bioethics governance structure; codified ethical
standards, licensing through ethical review and oversight/accountability through
research governance. In origin, this emerged from within the professions and serves
to protect its reputation. Its continuation is typically justified by reference to a series
of historical scandals against whose recurrence the governance system is claimed to
provide protection for participants.
Bioethics Governance as the Restraint of Irresponsible Science
A second explanatory narrative for the need for bioethics governance lies in fears
about scientific advance. In this story, science is portrayed as being driven by a
technological imperative, doing things because it can, without regard for whether it
should. This was one of the planks of the argument put forward by Kennedy for the
establishment of national a bioethics commission on theUSAmodel in the 1980s [32].
It is this aspect of bioethics governance that lay behind the creation of the Nuffield
Council on Bioethics in 1991. Its terms of reference, as yet unchanged, require it:
To identify and define ethical questions raised by recent advances in biological
and medical research in order to respond to, and to anticipate, public concern;
To make arrangements for examining and reporting on such questions with a
view to promoting public understanding and discussion;
It is also charged with publishing reports on these matters and making represen-
tations to appropriate regulatory or other bodies. The working assumption is that
scientific advances are a matter of public concern that needs to be allayed.
As with the evolution of research governance, it would be wrong to see the
creation of commissions charged with considering the implications of scientific
advance as external regulation driven by lay people or even as necessarily resisted
by scientists. Warnock, another advocate of a national commission, suggested that it
would be a counter-balance to
an almost medieval obscurantism… a hostility to science based on vague
thoughts that there are some things that we should not know, but based more
than anything on fear and ignorance…. After the last war there was there was
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a cliche´ to the effect that man’s scientific knowledge has outstripped his moral
sense. At that time it was uttered in the context of the physical sciences. The
bomb had, rightly, frightened us all. Now the same cliche´ is more and more to
be heard in the context of the biological sciences. We must take it seriously.
Only within an ethical framework widely seen to be secure and sensible can
we continue, as we must, to push back the frontiers of science [64].
Although the source of public concern is different, bioethics governance is once
again a mechanism for enabling public confidence to be maintained.
It is amoot pointwhether ‘science’ is a single thing aboutwhich concerns are raised,
or whether the need for governance arises differently in relation to distinct issues. The
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, as a non-government body, does not precisely reflect
the expectations of the UNESCO Declaration. It is, however, the only British body
with an overarching remit for keeping new bioethical issues under review. More
characteristically, the tendency of theUKhas been to address bioethical issues through
specialist institutions rather than a generic one. Thus, issues in assisted human
reproduction are on the agendas ofmany national bioethics commissions but in theUK
they have been addressed by sector specificmeans. TheWarnock Committee reported
on the policy in 1984 [55], leading to the creation of the sector regulator the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Questions around organ donation were
explored by the Redfern Committee into a scandal at Alder Hey, the Retained Organ
Commission, a sector regulator (TheHumanTissueAuthority), a Parliamentary Select
Committee and an Organ Donation Task Force. Non-Government investigations into
organ donation have included reports from the King’s Fund, the Nuffield Council and
from the BMA. The UK’s preparation for pandemics has included a Committee on the
Ethics of Pandemic Influenza. Some of the issues around the biodata being gathered by
Genomics England have been addressed by the ad hoc route of asking a trusted
bioethicist to convene a group of people to help draft a letter of advice to the Chief
Medical Officer. Parliamentary Select Committees have examined a number of other
bioethical questions generated by scientific advances, including regenerative
medicine, mitochondrial DNA donation, and the use of biodata.
It is also clear that there are important bioethical issues that are perceived to give
rise to governance challenges that are not driven by scientific advance but by
clashes of values. While interest in bioethics governance can be promoted by
‘morally disruptive’ technologies [5], it is not necessary to have new technologies
for bioethical controversy to arise. This can be seen in relation to debates over
abortion, where technological advances (such as the move to medical rather than
surgical methods) provide the opportunity to revisit fundamental conflicts over the
status of the human fetus rather than generate new ethical arguments. It can also be
seen in deliberations over end of life care, where the arguments are well known but
the solutions remain hotly contested. In the UK, the private member’s bill process
has led to full Parliamentary debates on assisted dying in both Houses, but this has
not resolved the matter.6 We need therefore to consider further explanations of the
role and function of bioethics governance processes.
6 Assisted Dying Bill 2014, Assisted Dying Bill (No 2) 2015.
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Governance as a Response to Pluralism
A starting point would be the fact of deep disagreement; a problem of moral
pluralism [18]. This creates a challenge for bioethics governance mechanisms to
achieve a sufficient degree of closure to enable health and research systems to
function. This will clearly be a key feature of clinical ethics support, in which the
patient’s position will often dictate a timescale for decisions to be taken. In the
policy context, decisions may also need to be taken within specific time frames.
There is no neutral position in the face of controversy about, or professional and
public demand to be permitted to use, new (or indeed established) technologies. A
decision to sustain the status quo needs justification just as much as one to reform
the position. The decision cannot, therefore, be ducked. Amongst the functions of
bioethics governance is to legitimate such decisions.
Sometimes, this might be a form of closure that claims to have resolved a
substantive dispute and answered the concerns. In other circumstances, however, the
position may be reached on a temporary or provisional basis, so that pressing policy
decisions can be made but revisited at a later date. Here, it might be better to
describe the governance process as one whereby jurisdictional distinctions are
created that allocate the decisions to particular decision-making processes. Under
such an approach, an issue is regarded as closed in certain fora, and the settling of
controversy is deferred or diverted to a different forum. Thus, pluralism is
acknowledged in a way that balances the desire for public debate with the need to
facilitate research and clinical care.
An illustration can be found in the terms of the Abortion Act 1967, which sets out
conditions when termination of pregnancy is permissible. For the purposes of
individual clinical decisions this defines the ethical questions, balancing women’s
rights with other values. The responsibility for assessing whether those conditions
are met is allocated to two medical practitioners. Accountability is limited to the
scrutiny of their good faith and does not extend to the substantive judgment itself.
Controversy remains about the legitimacy of this settlement but it is deferred away
from the clinic to Parliament, managerial oversight and political campaigning. In
such fora, the issues are far from resolved.
A further aspect of jurisdictional deferral can be seen in the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act’s tiers of authority to create norms [40]. Some matters are
determined by Parliament, some by the HFEA through its licensing conditions or
Code of Practice, and some by clinics or individual clinicians. This distribution of
authority is a key technique of bioethics governance. These decision-makers remain
accountable through Parliament and in the courts. Without this, the jurisdictional
settlement would become unstable but with sufficient accountability it can handle
the challenges of balancing competing values in society and enable decisions on
bioethical issues to be implemented. Separating out these tiers of norm-making
powers enables the differentiation of who should be involved in which types of
activities. It seems legitimate for the HFEA to exclude from the licensing committee
those who are opposed on principle, in order to ensure that the legislation is applied
and not undermined. However, a governance structure that completely prevented the
possibility of dispute over such issues would soon lose its legitimacy.
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If bioethics governance is to be an effective response to the challenge of moral
pluralism an account is therefore required of the ways its processes for mediating
between conflicting factions demonstrate sufficient respect for differences to justify
acting on conclusions reached [8]. This might involve some appeal to the
representativeness of the membership of governance bodies. Thus, the constitution
of some national ethics committees requires that membership includes a range of
characteristics that reflect the diversity of the populations. The Belgian Advisory
Committee on Bioethics has its origins in a co-operation agreement of 15 January
1993 signed by the federal Government, the French-speaking Community, the
Dutch-speaking Community, the German-speaking Community and the Joint
Commission for Community Matters. It has 35 voting members, representing
various constituencies, each of which must evenly balance French and Dutch
speaking members. Each of member has an alternate to ensure that their perspective
is not lost if they are absent.7
It seems clear that the fact of pluralism is one of the important contexts in which
the institutions of bioethics governance function. However, it does not explain the
creation of bodies specifically concerned with bioethics rather than more general
approaches to public debate and democratic decision-making. The observation by
Evans that in the USA, the gatekeepers have turned away from inviting professional
bioethicists to dominate the jurisdictional spaces in favour of partisan social
movements draws attention to the need to identify a justificatory narrative for
bioethics governance that makes a substantive ethical contribution to the ways in
which pluralism is acknowledged.
Governance as a Response to Relativism
A fourth sustaining narrative for bioethics governance concerns its claim to move
beyond a relativist assumption that all ethical opinions are entitled to equal respect.
It needs to be more than just counting votes if it can claim to be worthy of separate
consideration beyond other democratic mechanisms. Issues might be resolved by
plebiscite, counting votes, as in the decision of Oregon to permit physician assisted
suicide [58]. It has been argued that the governance of new health technologies in
the European Union has been determined more by regulation of markets, based on
managing risk and respecting human rights, than by ethics [21]. Bioethics
governance seems to be based on the idea that there is something sufficiently
distinctive about the topics within its scope to render these mechanisms
unsatisfactory. It aims for substantive ethical argument to drive decision-making.
Market approaches make such arguments exceptional, reasons to restrict the normal
economic freedoms. Plebiscites privilege the quantity of support rather than its
basis. An opinion counts even if it is rationally indefensible or based on scientific
error.
The response to challenge relativism takes one of two main forms. The first is
substantive and takes the form of a search for common principles that can then be
7 http://www.health.belgium.be/eportal/Healthcare/Consultativebodies/Commitees/Bioethics/Mission,composi
tion,functionin/index.htm#.Vh7DEs9dGUk (last accessed 14 October 2015).
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implemented through the governance institutions. In this model, the relationship
between the committees and the ethical debates may be ambiguous and questions
arise as to how far they should be concerned with substantive ethics and how far
with ensuring compliance with standards of which they are stewards not creators [2,
36]. The response to relativism lies in the robustness of the principles rather than the
enforcement processes.
We have already seen how the emergence of principlism in the USA to take this
role can be linked to the Rawlsian idea of ‘public reason’. The essence of this
approach is the use of concepts that can provide a common currency for debate,
even though they will be supported by participants for different (and sometimes
contradictory) reasons, and do not involve judging the morality of others: ‘it neither
criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except
insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a
democratic polity’ [54].
In the context of clinical ethics, there are manifestations of the public reason
approach in the form of professional guidance, consensus statements and regulatory
requirements for maintaining a licence to practise. The study of bioethics
governance might take the form of reviewing such documentary manifestations as
evidence of the content of bioethical public reason.
In relation to the wider functions of bioethics in support of public policy,
international conventions can be seen as a similar response to the challenges of
relativism through the establishment of a foundation of common principles. The
UNESCO Declaration has already been noted. The Council of Europe’s Oviedo
Convention provides another example. Developed within the human rights paradigm,
it pronounces on issues that are firmly within the scope of academic bioethics and
subsequent protocols have extended its reach further. Whether the process is seen as
intellectually satisfactory or merely an exercise in politics will determine whether this
turn to ‘public reason’ provides a satisfactory response to the problem of relativism [3]
and requires consideration of the logic of public ethics [43, 68].
There is a second approach that seeks to address the challenge of moving from
disagreement to some normative framework without simply accepting the validity
of different views in our pluralist societies. Here the focus is not on the premises and
conclusions of public reason, but upon the character of the processes that are
thought in themselves to provide legitimacy for the positions reached. The Nuffield
Council on Bioethics has adopted a position of this type. A stock take of its work, by
Chan and Harris in 2006, suggested that it might have incrementally developed
something a little like ‘Nuffield Council Ethical Framework for Bioethics’ [11].
They identified a number of principles that seemed to be drawn upon, although not
always consistently; avoidance of harm, the duty of beneficence, respect for persons
and autonomy, justice and just resource allocation, informed consent, confidentiality
and privacy, respect for dignity, and naturalness.
Since then, the Council has committed itself to a different legitimation narrative
based on the procedural aspects of public reasoning rather than its conceptual
content. In response to the fact of pluralism, it has committed to a principle of
‘inclusiveness: no single view or approach to bioethics should be favoured, and the
expression of all views should be encouraged and welcomed [45].’ On this basis
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legitimacy can be drawn partly from the fact that no one has been excluded from the
debate. In response to the problem of relativism, it has asserted the importance of
applying to all arguments ‘tests of coherence and rationality’ in a rigorous way,
‘based on the best evidence available, and supported by careful and comprehensive
analysis’ [45]. Here the approach seeks to distinguish the resolution of disagreement
through compromise and negotiation from bioethics by characterizing it as an
evidence-based argumentative activity in which participants must justify and not
merely assert their positions.
Conclusions
The approach adopted by the Nuffield Council could be little more than a particular
manifestation of the principles of deliberative democracy. However, this is where it
becomes necessary to reflect on the interrelationship between the senses of bioethics
that were explored in the earlier sections of this piece. It is a deliberative process,
but it is overseen by a group of people selected for knowledge and interest in the
disciplines that the Council perceives relevant to contribute to the field of bioethics.
The idea of bioethics as a discipline is rejected in favour of an understanding of a
field of inquiry. However, the activities of the Council are very much of the nature
of an expert enterprise in policy engagement. The Council is influential in policy
fora, but has no formal authority. It is therefore reliant on implementation structures
being in place for bioethics governance. So, bioethics is all of the things that have
been discussed. However, its nature as a governance practice is an important
dimension of the ecology of bioethics.
Recognition of the value of seeing bioethics as a governance practice, raises areas
for enquiry that can too easily be overlooked. First, the legitimacy of its institutions
to operate in the public sphere needs more explanation and justification than it
currently demonstrates. This will include consideration of the people who are
involved; how they are selected; the nature of the authority that they exercise; the
processes by which positions are reached; the efficiency, proportionality and
effectiveness of the accountability mechanisms that can be invoked. Second, further
elaboration of the forms of institutionalization of bioethics is needed. Third, there is
scope for study of the literary forms of bioethics governance; such as opinions,
reports, guidelines, consensus statements. The forms of dissemination of public
ethics are different to those of the academy and these differences are worthy of
examination. Studying bioethics as a governance practice focusses more on who
does things, how and why they do them, than in what they study and what they
conclude. It should not supersede other approaches to understanding bioethics, but it
should complement them.
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